A programme manager is coordinating the move to a new customer billing system. Finance, operations, and engineering have each supplied someone to the project. All three support the goal, but none has agreed how much capacity it will provide during the next month. The manager keeps updating the plan as those people are pulled back into other work.
The delay is easy to describe as weak project management. Before reaching that conclusion, examine what the manager was authorised to do. Maintaining a schedule is different from committing another department’s staff. If a plan assumes capacity that nobody has promised, more frequent updates will make the uncertainty visible without resolving it.
Managers without broad authority can still perform valuable work. The problem arises when an organisation expects coordination to settle trade-offs that require a decision from someone else, then gives that decision no reliable route or response time. Understanding where the work waits is more useful than treating every meeting as evidence of unnecessary management.
Coordination Has a Legitimate Job
A coordinating manager can discover dependencies, bring together evidence, maintain a common plan, and help specialists understand how their work connects. Those activities can reduce rework even when the manager has no direct reports. Influence and facilitation are relevant capabilities, particularly where no single function should decide alone.
For the billing migration, finance needs confidence in reconciliation, operations needs workable customer procedures, and engineering needs a recoverable deployment. Discussing those requirements is substantive work. An executive who makes the final decision quickly may be using evidence that took the programme manager several weeks to assemble.
The distinction is between time spent improving the available choice and time spent repeating a choice because nobody can commit. A second meeting that reveals an overlooked customer impact may be valuable. A fifth meeting that again confirms two departments want the same engineer, without anyone able to set priority, needs a different intervention.
Avoid treating disciplinary power as a prerequisite for effective management. A programme manager may have delegated scheduling authority, agreed service commitments, and an active sponsor without controlling anyone’s performance review. What matters is whether the relevant decisions can be made and implemented through the arrangement.
Trace a Decision Through Its Actual Path
Choose one stalled decision rather than auditing the entire calendar. In this example, the immediate question is whether engineering will reserve two weeks for migration testing. Record when the request became clear, when the necessary evidence was available, who needed to contribute, and when an authorised person finally committed capacity.
The waiting period may contain several different problems. Engineering might lack an estimate. A customer incident might have consumed the available capacity. The functional leader might agree in principle but be unable to displace a larger commitment. Alternatively, everyone might assume the programme manager can resolve a portfolio conflict that lies outside the programme.
Those situations should not be grouped under a single label such as stakeholder resistance. Missing estimates need investigation. A genuine incident may require replanning. A portfolio conflict needs a choice between competing commitments. Only some cases call for moving authority to the coordinating manager.
A short decision record can show the requested choice, the options, their effects on existing work, the person authorised to decide, and the date after which delay changes the plan. This is a way to make the problem reviewable. The record has little value if it simply joins a growing collection of status documents without reaching the relevant decision-maker.
Establish Capacity Before Treating the Plan as Committed
The billing programme should distinguish an estimate from a reservation. Engineering can estimate that testing needs two weeks without having promised which people will do it or when. A project plan that treats the estimate as a commitment overstates what has been agreed.
A usable capacity agreement names the contributing team, the period, the expected work, and how changes will be handled. It need not assign every hour. It should provide enough stability for dependent work and identify who can renegotiate when an urgent request arrives.
The programme manager may then have authority to sequence tasks inside that allocation while functional leaders retain staffing and professional standards. A change that consumes another team’s reserved capacity would return to the relevant leaders. This provides room to manage delivery without allowing the programme to rewrite departmental priorities unilaterally.
Where the organisation cannot make that commitment, it should present the date as conditional. Reporting a fixed milestone while leaving all contributing capacity discretionary transfers the uncertainty to the coordinating role. The related problem of responsibility without authority concerns how to negotiate that remit before it becomes a personal performance promise.
Give Repeated Decisions a Bounded Route to Closure
Not every change should reach the executive sponsor. The programme manager could be authorised to reorder migration tasks within the agreed release window, provided reconciliation checks and recovery requirements remain satisfied. A change to the customer billing date might require a sponsor decision with finance and operations input.
The boundaries should describe the consequences that trigger review, rather than rely only on a list of job titles. A small cost may still matter if it creates a new contractual obligation. A technically reversible change may still require consultation if it alters what customers have been promised.
Public-sector guidance offers a relevant design principle. The GOV.UK Service Manual’s agile governance guidance connects governance with timely decisions and appropriate authority. It is guidance for government service delivery, not a rule that every business must adopt the same process. Its practical relevance here is the connection between the decision and the people able to make it.
A sponsor should also define what happens when the normal route cannot respond in time. This may involve a deputy, a scheduled decision slot, or a temporary operating position. Silence should not automatically mean approval. The decision-rights design needs to state which commitments remain valid while an exception is unresolved.
Measure the Delay Without Penalising Necessary Review
A useful assessment can follow a small sample of decisions over several weeks. Compare elapsed time, time spent preparing new evidence, repeated requests for the same input, and the number of times a decision reopened. Include the effect on delivery, rather than counting meetings alone.
For the billing migration, a two-day reconciliation review might prevent costly correction after release. Removing it would make the process look faster while weakening the evidence. By contrast, requiring three separate leaders to approve an unchanged testing allocation may add little if none has a distinct review responsibility.
The comparison should also look downstream. Faster approval is not an improvement if decisions repeatedly need reversal because affected teams were excluded. Check whether the revised process reduces waiting while maintaining the quality of the resulting choice and the reliability of commitments.
These observations do not establish a universal financial cost of coordination or a mathematical law about how delay grows with team count. They provide local evidence. If a company wants to estimate the cost, it needs its own assumptions about staff time, displaced work, and consequences of the delayed outcome.
Before removing an approval, ask the approver what distinct judgement it provides. A finance check may address an obligation the delivery team does not see. If the concern can be covered by an agreed spending boundary or standard contract, the routine route may become simpler while exceptions retain review. This makes the change easier to assess than a blanket request for fewer stakeholders or faster decisions.
Redesign the Role Around the Work It Can Actually Do
The diagnosis may support several changes. Some routine decisions can move into the programme manager’s mandate. Others can remain with functional leaders but receive explicit response expectations. A portfolio sponsor may need to resolve competition across programmes before a delivery date can be confirmed.
There may also be too much work in the role. Chasing approvals, maintaining detailed reports, facilitating workshops, and managing implementation can exceed one person’s capacity even under clear authority. Removing a redundant approval will not solve an impossible workload. Conversely, adding another coordinator will not settle a priority dispute that still has no available decision-maker.
Try the revised arrangement on the next phase of the migration. Give affected teams the same account of the mandate and test it against a realistic interruption, such as a finance deadline colliding with a customer incident. Ask who decides, what evidence they need, and which work pauses in the meantime.
Keep an explicit distinction between the manager’s performance and the sponsor’s performance. The manager can be assessed on the accuracy of the plan, timely escalation, and execution within the agreed allocation. The sponsor can be assessed on the choices and commitments they retained. This gives both roles something concrete to improve, rather than making the coordinator answer for an unresolved priority decision.
A coordinating manager adds value when they turn separate contributions into a usable plan and help the organisation act on it. Repeated negotiation becomes avoidable delay when the same conflict returns without new evidence or a route to commitment. The repair is to make that route usable and match expectations to the role’s actual remit.





